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INPUT-OUTPUT STRUCTURE AND THE GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS OF INFLATION
AND OUTPUT

Kevin X.D. Huang and Zheng Liu

ABSTRACT

Recent empirical studies reveal that monetary shocks cause persistent fluctuations in inflation
and aggregate output. In the literature, few mechanisms have been identified to generate such
persistence. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism that does so. Our model features an
input-output structure and staggered price contracts. Working through the input-output relations
and the timing of firms' pricing decisions, the model generates smaller fluctuations in marginal
cost facing firms at later stages than at earlier stages and hence persistent responses of both the
inflation rate and aggregate output following a monetary stock. The persistence is larger, the
greater the number of production stages. With a sufficient number of stages, the real persistence
is arbitrarily large.
JEL classification: E31, E32, E52
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INPUT-OUTPUT STRUCTURE AND THE GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS OF INFLATION
ANDOUTPUT*

1 Introduction
An order for a new computer often initiates a chain of orders for parts. When the order arrives at a

computer vendor's desk, the vendor will start contacting suppliers of microchips, processors, hard-drives,
monitors, and operating systems. The monitor maker will then contact suppliers of plastic, glass, and
electronic components; and the plastic maker will respond by sending out orders to its own suppliers, and
so on. The computer itself, once made, is frequently used as an intermediate input in the production of
other goods.
Production of a final good typically requires multiple stages of processing. A thesis of this paper is
that the multistage structure of production is important for explaining the relationship between money and
aggregate economic activity. We show that the input-output structure helps explain persistent fluctuations
in both the inflation rate and aggregate output following a monetary shock.
It is an old idea that in an industrialized economy the relationship between money, prices, and output

is tied to the interdependence of firms at different stages of production. The idea has been presented at
least since Means (1935). Here we quote Basu (1995):
[Means] presented evidence that different industries had very different patterns of price
changes versus quantity changes in the Great Depression. Means showed that simple goods, such
as agricultural products, declined heavily in price, while their quantity was almost unchanged.
Complex manufactured goods, on the other hand, showed the opposite pattern, with small price
changes and consequently huge declines in the quantity of sales. Crude manufactured goods fell
somewhere in between.
More recent studies have confirnled Means's finding on the patterns of price changes at different stages
of production (e.g. , Gordon (1981), Blanchard (1987), Clark (1999), and Hanes (1999)).
The evidence presented by Means (1935) and others have led many to speculate that there are
connections between the chain structure of production and aggregate fluctuations. For example, Gordon
(1990) considers "the input-output table as an essential component in the description of price stickiness."
Yet, few attempts have been made to theorize the idea, with the notable exception of Blanchard (1983)
Blanchard (1983) shows that a simple structural model incorporating a chain of production and sticky
*Huang: Department of Economics, Utah State University, 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322-3530,
U. S.A. ; khuang@b202 .usu.edu Liu: Department of Economics, Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA
01610, U .S .A ., and Center for Research for Economic Fluctuations and Employment, Montreal, Canada;
zliu@clarku.edu We are grateful to Olivier Blanchard, V.V. Chari, and Narayana Kocherlakota for helpful
conversations on this project. We also wish to thank Susanto Basu, Harold L. Cole, Andreas Erosa, Michael Horvath,
Peter Ireland, Patrick Kehoe, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, EllenR. McGrattan, Michael Parkin, Manuel Santos, Nancy Stokey,
and Gustavo Ventura for helpful suggestions. Previous versions of this paper have been circulated under the title,
"Chain of Production as a Monetary Propagation Mechanism," and have been presented at Boston College, Brandeis
University, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the University of Minnesota, Utah State University, the
University of Westem Ontario, and the Econometric Society 2000 Winter Meeting. We thank the seminar participants
for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis for providing excellent research support when we were visiting there. The usual disclaimer applies.
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prices can generate patterns of price changes similar to those noted by Means (1935).
Blanchard (1983) was concerned with explaining the sluggish adjustment of the price level. More
recently, another set of empirical facts has attracted attention: the persistent responses of the inflation rate
and aggregate output to a monetary shock (e .g., Christiano et al. (1999)). Nelson (1998) compares the
ability of several popular business cycle models with sticky prices in generating the inflation persistence.
His finding suggests that most sticky price models need to be modified "to reconcile them with the actual
behavior of inflation." On the other hand, Chari et al. (1998) challenge the ability of traditional models
with staggered price contracts in the spirit of Taylor (1980) in explaining the output persistence. In
meeting this challenge, various mechanisms have been proposed, most of which focus on introducing factor
market frictions in the baseline model of Chari et al. (1998) (e .g., Huang and Liu (1998) and Gust (1998)) .

In this paper, we propose a new mechanism to explain the behavior of the inflation rate and aggregate
output following a monetary shock. We build a model in which the production of a final good goes through
multiple stages, as in Blanchard (1983), but in which the production of a final good goes through multiple
stages, as in Blanchard (1983), but in which individuals optimize. In the model, a firm at the first stage
uses labor as an input, while a firm at a later stage uses all outputs produced at the previous stage. A
representative household consumes a basket of goods produced at the final stage and supplies labor to firms
at the first stage . To generate real effects of a monetary shock, we assume that pricing decisions are
staggered at each stage (e.g., Taylor (1980, 1999)). We derive firms' optimal pricing decision rules within
the standard monopolistic competition framework (e.g., Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)). Working through
the input-output relations among industries across stages and the timing of pricing decisions among firms
within each stage, the model generates persistent responses of both the inflation rate and aggregate output
to a monetary shock. The persistence is larger, the greater the number of production stages. If the
production of a good goes through a sufficient number of stages, arbitrary real persistence obtains.
To illustrate the importance ofthe input-output structure in generating persistence, we first show that,
in the special case of a single production stage, there is neither inflation nor real effects of money beyond
the initial contract duration. In a single-stage model, prices immediately rise following the shock, since
the wage rate, and hence the marginal cost for all firms, rises quickly (e.g., Chari et al. (1998)). To
generate persistence in the inflation rate or in real output, more production stages are needed.
Our baseline model with multiple stages of production does generate persistent fluctuations in both
the inflation rate and real output, since firms at more advanced processing stages face smaller changes in
marginal cost and thus have less incentive to change prices than do firms at less advanced stages.
Following the shock, the marginal cost for firms at the first stage immediately rises and consequently
these firms raise prices fully whenever they have the chance to renew contracts. But firms at the second
stage do not face the full rise in marginal cost. Their marginal cost does not rise fully because it is
determined by the price index of the first-stage goods, and the price index records both the prices newly
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adjusted and those fixed by previous contracts. Thus firms at the second stage do not have an incentive
to adjust their prices fully even if they have the chance to renew contracts. In consequence, firms at the
third stage face an even smaller change in their marginal cost, and they have even less incentive to adjust
prices, and so on. It turns out that, when there are more processing stages, price level adjustments become
more sluggish and the responses of the inflation rate and real output to the shock become more persistent.
With a sufficient number of stages, the real persistence is arbitrarily large. 1
Our conclusion that the degree of price stickiness is a function of the number of production stages is
similar to that of Blanchard (1983), but for different reasons. In his model, pricing decisions are staggered
across different stages and firms within each stage are homogeneous. Basu (1995) points out that, "if
the pricing decision in Blanchard's model were made state-dependent then, since the 'first good' is made
without intermediate goods, there would be no increase in price rigidity regardless of the number of stages
of production." But Basu's (1995) criticism does not apply to our model. In our model, pricing decisions
are staggered among firms within each stage. Under a state-dependent pricing rule, firms at each stage
in general do not have an incentive to synchronize as long as they face different costs of changing prices
(e.g., Dotsey, et al. (1997, 1999)). As long as firms at some stages of production do not synchronize, the
effect of a monetary shock on price adjustments will be dampened along the production chain. 2
There is also some similarity between our model and that ofBasu (1995), both suggesting that a small
rigidity in prices of intermediate goods generates large real effects of a monetary shock. Yet, the models differ in two aspects. First, Basu (1995) assumes pricing decisions are state-dependent, while in our
model, they are time-dependent. As we have just noted, our results are robust under state-dependent pricing rules. Second, and more importantly, the input-output structures differ. Basu (1995) assumes a single
production stage with a roundabout input-output structure, while we have multiple stages of processing
with an in-line chain-of-production structure. Both types of input-output structure are empirically relevant. While Basu (1995) has shown that a roundabout input-output structure is an important source of real
rigidity, we demonstrate here that the chain structure of production plays an important role in propagating
monetary shocks.
The assumption that pricing decisions are staggered is supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Taylor
(1999)). Yet, answering the question of why there is staggering rather than complete synchronization is
ITherefore the multi-stage production structure creates a "real rigidity" in the sense of Ball and Romer (1990). It is also
important to recognize that, the meaning of "inflation persistence" here is different from that in, for example, Fuhrer and Moore
(1995). By "inflation persistence," they mean that disinflation causes an output loss (see also Ball (1994, 1995)), while here we
refer to the high serial correlation in the response of inflation to a monetary shock (see also Nelson (1998)).
2Casual observations suggest that many firms do face different menu costs .
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beyond the scope of this paper. In the literature, some progress has been made on this issue. Dotsey,
et al. (1997) show that introducing heterogeneity of menu costs across firms can result in endogenous
staggering. Ball and Romer (1989) demonstrate that staggering is an equilibrium outcome if there are
firm-specific shocks that arrive at different time for different firms. Ball and Cecchetti (1988) show that,
with imperfect information, firms cannot distinguish between aggregate demand shocks and firm-specific
shocks, and thus do not have an incentive to synchronize. Gordon (1990) argues that, in a world with
imperfect information, the complexity of the input-output table makes it unlikely for firms to synchronize,
since "the typical firm has no idea of the identity of its full set of suppliers when all the indirect links within
the input-output table are considered.... [T]he sensible firm just waits by the mailbox for news of cost
increases and then ... passes them on as price increases." Clearly, incorporating these elements and thus
making staggering endogenous will make the model more intuitively appealing. But it will not change
the mechanism through which the production chain propagates monetary shocks.
The assumption that labor market is perfectly competitive is for the purpose of isolating the role of
the input-output structure in transmitting monetary shocks. Under this assumption, labor costs change
quickly following a shock, creating an incentive for a quick price adjustment. Thus, any price level
rigidity is generated solely through the input-output structure. Incorporating labor market rigidity will
dampen fluctuations of labor costs and therefore, along with the input-output interactions, will generate
more sluggish changes in the price level. In this sense, adding labor market rigidity strengthens our
results.
In what follows, we describe the model in Section 2, present the results in Section 3, and conclude the
paper in Section 4. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.

2

The Model

In the model, production of consumption goods requires N stages of processing, from crude material
to intermediate goods, then to more advanced goods, and so on. At each stage, there is a continuum of
firms indexed in the interval [0, 1], producing differentiated goods. Production at stage n E {2, ... ,N}
requires all goods produced at stage n -1, while production at the first stage (i.e., the raw material sector)
uses homogeneous labor services provided by a representative household (see Figure 1 for an illustration
of the economy's structure).
In each period t, there realizes a shock St. The history of events up to date t is
probability 1r( st). The initial realization So is given.

st

= (so, ... ,St), with
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The representative household is infinitely lived and has an expected lifetime utility given by

where (3 E (0,1) is a subjective discount factor, C(st) is consumption, M(st) is nominal money balances,

L(st) is labor hours, and FN(st) is a price index of goods produced at the final stage (i.e., a price level).
The consumption good is a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) composite of final-stage goods. Specifically, we have

C(st) =

[10

1

YN(i, st) e;;,

dile~, == Y(st),

(1)

where YN (i, st) is a type i good produced at stage Nand e is an elasticity of substitution among all such
goods. The household is endowed with one unit of time in each period. It faces a sequence of budget
constraints

r PN(i, st)YN(i, st)di + 2:: D(st+l lst)B(st+l) + M(st)
10
1

(2)

st+1

::; W(st)L(st)

+ II(st) + B(st) + M(st-l) + T(st),

where PN(i, st) is the price of a type i good produced at the final stage, B(st+l) is a one-period nominal
bond that costs D( st+llst) dollars at st and pays off one dollar in the next period if st+l is realized,

W(st) is a nominal wage, II(st) is the household's claim to all firms' profits, and T(st) is a nominal
lump-sum transfer from the government. The household maximizes utility subject to (1), (2), and a
borrowing constraint B (st) ~ - B for some large positive B, taking the wage and prices as given. The
initial conditions M(s-l) and B(sO) are also taken as given.
The price index FN(st) is given by FN(st)

=

[fl PN(i, st)l-Odi]

1

1-8.

It follows that the expenditure

on the basket of consumption goods equals the total expenditure on all types of goods produced at the final
stage, that is, FN(st)Y(st)

=

fl PN(i, st)YN(i, st)di. The demand function for a type i good produced

at stage N is

Y Nd(.?', S t)

=

PN(i, s t )
[ PN ( S t)

]-0 Y( t)
S

.

(3)

Thus, the more expensive is good i relative to other stage- N goods, the lower is the relative demand for i.
Production of each good at stage n E {2, ... ,N} requires all goods produced at the previous stage.
Specifically, the production function is

(4)
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where Yn(i, st) is the output of finn i at stage nand Y n- 1(i,j, st) is the input supplied by finn j at stage

n - 1. Production of each good at the first stage uses labor, with a constant returns to scale production
function Y1 (i, st)

= L(i, st), where Y 1 (i, st) is the output and L(i, st)

is the labor input.

To generate real effects of monetary shocks, we assume that pricing decisions are staggered (e.g.,
Taylor (1980, 1999)), and we derive optimal pricing decision rules within a monopolistic competition
framework (e.g., Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)). To focus on the role of the chain-of-production in
propagating monetary shocks, we look at simple two-period staggered price contracts. Under such contracts, in each period, half of the finns at each stage can set new prices for their outputs. Once a price is
set, it remains effective for two periods, which is referred to as a "contract duration". We sort the indices
of finns at each stage so that those indexed i E [0, 1/2] set new prices in periods 0,2,4, ... , and those
indexed i E (1/2,1] set new prices in periods 1,3,5, ... , and so on. Fonnally, upon the realization of st,
if finn i at stage n E {1, ... , N} can set a new price, it chooses Pn(i, st) to solve

t+l

Max

LL

D(STlst)[Pn(i, st) - Vn(i, sT)]Y;(i, ST),

(5)

taking its unit cost function Vn (i, ST) and a demand schedule Y:!( i, ST) as given.
The unit cost for finns at the first stage is simply the nominal wage rate, that is, VI (s T) == VI (i, s T)

=

W(ST), since labor is the only input at that stage. The unit cost for finns at stage n E {2, ... , N}
is derived from minimizing the cost fol Pn-l(j)Yn- 1 (i,j)dj subject to (4). The resulting unit cost is
1

Vn(ST) == Vn(i, ST)

=

Fn_ 1 (sT),

where

Fn_ 1 (sT) == [fo1 Pn- 1 (j, sT)I- 0 dj]

1-9

is a price index of all

goods produced at stage n - 1. Given constant-returns-to-scale technologies, the unit cost is also the
marginal cost and it is finn-independent.
In the case with n E {2, ... , N}, the finn's demand for good j produced at stage n - 1 is also derived

from the cost-minimization problem and is given by
d (. . T)
Y n-l
'l,],S

=

Rn-l (.], s T)]-O v (. T)
.In'l,s.
[ P _ (sT)

n

1

The total demand for good j is the sum of the demand by all finns at stage n, that is,

1

d (. T) = [Pn- (j, ST)
Y n-l],S
D
(T)
.Ln-l

S

]-0 .InS,
T)
"l,T (

(6)

where Y n (ST) == fol Yn (i, sT)di is a linear aggregate of stage-n outputs. Equation (6) says that the demand
for j is higher if its price relative to the price index of all stage- (n - 1) goods is lower.
Solving the profit-maximization problem (5) yields the optimal pricing decision rule

l:sr D(STlst)ynd(i, ST)Vn(ST)
. t)
S
= -e- -l:;~~
--'---=----=-------'-------'------n,
e - 1 l:;~~ l:sr D(STlst)Yt(i, ST) ,

R ('l

(7)
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where n E {l, ... ,N}. Thus the optimal price is a constant mark-up over a weighted average of the firm's
marginal costs within the contract duration. The weights are normalized total demand for its output. In
light of (3) and (6), the weights depend on industry- and economy-wide variables only. If the expected
marginal costs rise, the firm will respond by raising its price.
A monetary authority injects newly created money into the economy via a lump-sum transfer to the
household, so that
(8)

The money supply MS(st) grows at a rate J-L(st) , that is, MS(st) = J-L(st)MS(st-l). We assume that
In J-L (st) follows a stationary stochastic process.
An equilibrium for this economy consists of allocations {YN(i, st)}iE[O,l], L(st), M(st), and B(st+l)
for the household, allocations {L( i, st) hE[o,l] and prices {PI (i, st) }iE[O,l] for firms at the first stage, allocations {Yn-1(i,j, st)h,jE[o,l] and prices {Pn(i, st)}iE[O,l] for firms at stage n, for every n E {2, ... , N},
and wage rate W(st), bond prices D(st+llst) , and price indices {Pn(st)}nE{l, ... ,N} that satisfy the following conditions: (i) taking wage and prices as given, the household's allocations solve the utility
maximization problem; (ii) taking wage and all prices but its own as given, each firm's allocation and
price solve its profit maximization problem; (iii) markets for labor, money, and bonds clear; (iv) money
supply and transfers are as specified.
It is important to recognize that the composite of final goods Y(st) in (1) can be interpreted as an

aggregate output, corresponding to real GDP in the data. 3 To justify this interpretation, first observe
that, in an equilibrium, the budget constraint (2) is binding since the utility function is strictly monotone.
Then, by imposing the money market clearing condition and the transfer process (8), we can cancel out
the terms involving money balances and transfers in the budget equation. From the bond market clearing
condition (i.e., B(st) = 0), the terms involving nominal bonds drop out. Thus, with the equilibrium
relation PN(st)Y(st)

=

fol

PN(i, st)YN(i, st)di, the budget equation reduces to

The left-hands side of the equation is the aggregate expenditure while the right-hand side is the total
income, including wage income and equity income. The equity income is the total profits of firms at
all production stages. Thus the right-hand side is also the aggregate value-added. It is clear from this
equation that Y (st) corresponds to real aggregate output, or real GDP.
3In our closed-economy model with no capital or government spending, real GDP corresponds to aggregate consumption.
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We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which firms in the same cohort make identical decisions. In
a symmetric equilibrium, firms are identified by the stage at which they produce and the time at which
they can change prices. Thus we drop the indices i and j for individual firms, and let Pn (t) denote prices
set at time t for goods produced at stage n E {1, ... ,N}.

3

The Results

In this section, we show that the chain structure of production helps explain the persistent responses of

the inflation rate and aggregate output to a monetary shock. The persistence increases with the number of
production stages. When there is a sufficient number of stages, arbitrary real persistence obtains.
To elaborate the results, we derive analytical solutions to a log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions. We begin by reducing the equilibrium conditions to 2N + 2 equations, including N pricing decision
equations, a labor supply decision equation, a money demand equation, and N equations defining price
indices. We then log-linearize these equations around a deterministic steady state. In what follows, we
use lowercase letters to denote the log-deviations of the corresponding level variables from their steady
state values. 4
The linearized pricing decision rule for firms at stage n E {1, ... ,N} is given by

Pn(t) = 1 ~ fjPn-l(t)

!

+ 1 fjE t [Pn-l(t + 1)],

(9)

where po(t) denotes the nominal wage w(t) and E t is a conditional expectation operator. According
to (9), a firm's optimal price is a weighted average of its expected marginal costs within the contract
duration. The marginal cost for a firm at stage n E {2, ... ,N} is the price index of goods produced at
stage n - 1 since the firm uses all these goods as inputs. The marginal cost for a firm at the first stage is
the nominal wage since labor is the only input of that stage. If the marginal costs are expected to rise, a
firm will respond by setting a higher price if it can renew its contract.
The labor supply decision of the household is described by

w(t)

= PN(t) + y(t).

(10)

Thus real wage is proportional to aggregate output. The money demand equation is

PN(t)

+ y(t)

=

(1 - (3)m(t)

+ f3Et[PN(t + 1) + y(t + 1)].

(11)

4We derive the equilibrium conditions and report the log-linearization process in a Technical Appendix, which is available
upon request.
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Therefore, nominal GDP is a weighted average of money and expected future nominal GDP. The presence
of the expectation terms in (11) reveals that the money demand is interest-rate sensitive.
Finally, the price index at stage n E {I , ... , N} is related to pricing decisions by

1

1

Pn(t) = 2Pn(t - 1) + 2Pn (t).

(12)

Under the staggered contracts, the price index at each stage records both the price set in the current period
and that set in the previous period. The lagged price enters (12) because each contract lasts for two
periods.
The equilibrium conditions are fully described by (9)-(12). To focus on the role of the input-output
structure in generating persistence in the inflation rate and aggregate output, we assume that there is no
serial correlation in the money growth process. In particular, we assume that the money supply follows a
random walk process, i.e., m(t)

= m(t -1) + E(t), where E(t)

is a white noise disturbance corresponding

to the money growth rate. Suppose that there is a one percent shock to the money growth rate in period 0,
that is, E(O)

=

1 and E(t)

=

0 for all t

2 1. We compute the impulse response functions to determine how

the shock is divided between movements in the price level and in aggregate output. Thus, we focus on
a perfect foresight equilibrium and drop the expectation operator E t . The following proposition partially
characterizes the equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 3.1:

There is a unique perfect foresight equilibrium in which

w(t)

1,

t 2 0,

Pn(t)

1,

t 2 n -1,

Pn(t)

1,

t 2 n,

y(t)

0,

t2N.

(13)

n E {l, ... ,N},

(14)

n E {I,,,., N},

(15)
(16)

Following the shock, nominal wage immediately rises, so does the marginal cost for firms at the first
stage. These firms thus fully raise their prices whenever they can renew contracts. At the end of the initial
contract duration when they all have had a chance to change prices, the first-stage price index is entirely
composed of fully raised prices and thus rises fully as well.
In the case of a single production stage (i.e. , N

=

1), there is neither inflation nor real effects of

money beyond the initial contract duration since, in this case, the price level corresponds to the firststage price index which rises fully as soon as the initial contract duration is over. Clearly, to obtain
a persistent response of the inflation rate or of real output, a sluggish adjustment of the price level is

10

necessary. We now demonstrate that, with multiple production stages, the model does generate such a
sluggish adjustment.
PROPOSITION

3.2: Suppose N

~

2. In the perfect foresight equilibrium, the strict inequalities

~

n - 1,

Pn+l (t)

< Pn(t),

o~ t

Pn+l(t)

< Pn(t),

O~t~n

(17)
(18)

hold for every n E {I, ... , N - I}.

Hence, when the number of stages increases, changes in the price level are smaller on a period-byperiod basis and the price level does not rise fully for more periods. In other words, the greater the number
of stages, the more sluggish is the adjustment of the price level.
The key to understanding this result is to see how the effects of the shock on marginal costs are
gradually dampened through the chain. The dampening process is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case with
N

= 2 (the arrows in the figure correspond to the equilibrium relations between price decisions and price

indices described by (9) and (12)). Following the shock, firms at the first stage face a full rise in marginal
cost and consequently raise their prices fully whenever they can renew contracts. Firms at the second
stage, however, do not face the full rise in marginal cost until the second period arrives. The marginal cost
of these firms is equal to the first-stage price index. In the impact period, this price index is an average of
the prices newly adjusted and those fixed by contracts and therefore, does not rise fully. Facing a partial
increase in marginal cost, firms at the second stage choose not to raise their prices fully even if they can
set new prices. At the end of the initial contract duration, the first-stage price index rises fully, so does
the marginal cost for firms at the second stage. Thus, those firms that can renew contracts do choose to
adjust prices accordingly. Yet, the second-stage price index does not rise fully because it is an average of
the prices newly adjusted and those partially adjusted in the impact period. In consequence, changes in
prices at the second stage are smaller and less rapid than do changes in prices at the first stage, and the
price level does not rise fully even when the initial contract duration is over.
When N becomes larger, the impact of the shock on marginal costs diminishes from earlier to later
stages, and the adjustments in the price level become more sluggish. In particular, the price level does not
rise fully until period N arrives, as illustrated by Table 1.
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A. Inflation Persistence
In light of Proposition 3.2, a greater number of production stages corresponds to more sluggish changes

in the price level. Thus, inflation will last for for more periods. In addition, the equilibrium relations
(10) and (13) suggest that, if adjustments of the price level are more sluggish, then the response of real

output will be larger on a period-by-period basis and be longer-lasting. This finding opens the way for the
chain-of-production mechanism to generate persistent effects of the shock on inflation and real output.
Yet, to have more persistent responses of the inflation rate and real output also requires higher autocorrelations in these variables so as to allow their impulse responses to die out more gradually following
the shock. In other words, it requires larger impulse responses in later periods relative to those in earlier
periods. Based on this idea, we measure the magnitude of persistence by the ratio of the impulse response
in period t to that in period t - 1. 5
We now establish the monotonicity of inflation persistence in the number of stages. With N stages,
the inflation rate in period t is equal to PN(t) - PN(t - 1). The inflation persistence is monotone if the
ratio of the inflation rate in period t to that in period t - 1 is increasing in N.
PROPOSITION 3.3 (Monotonicity of inflation persistence): In the perfect foresight equilibrium, the
strict inequality

PN+l(t) - PN+l(t - 1)
PN+l(t - 1) - PN+l(t - 2)

---------- >

holds for all N

~

PN(t) - PN(t - 1)
PN(t - 1) - PN(t - 2)'

1 :s; t :s; N

+ 1,

(19)

1.

Thus the greater is the number of stages, the more gradually does the response of the inflation rate die
out.

B. Output Persistence
Given the equilibrium relations in (10) and (13), real aggregate output in period t is equal to 1 - PN(t)
when there are N stages. Output persistence is monotone if the ratio of output in period t to that in period
t - 1 increases with N.
5To see why this measure corresponds to the first order auto-correlation, consider an arbitrary ARCl) process x(t)

= px(t -

1) + e(t), where, under perfect foresight, the residual term e(t) = 0 . Thus, the ratio x(t)/x(t - 1) measures the magnitude of
persistence.
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PROPOSITION 3.4 (Monotonicity of output persistence):

In the perfect foresight equilibrium, the

strict inequality
1 - PN+l(t)
I-PN+l(t-l)

--------:-------:- >
holds for all N

~

1 - PN(t)
I-PN(t-1)'

1 :S t :S N,

(20)

1.

Therefore, the greater the number of stages, the more persistent is the response of output to the
shock. To illustrate this result, we examine the model's implications on output persistence based on
two persistence measures which are special cases of ours. One is the ratio of the output response at the
end of the initial contract duration to that in the impact period (i.e., the "contract multiplier"). The other
is the number of periods it takes for output to return to half of the level of its initial response (i.e., the
"half-life"). As illustrated by Table 2, both the contract multiplier and the half-life increase with N. As
the number of stages grows from one to five and then to ten, for example, the contract multiplier increases
from 0 to 0.46 and then to 0.62.
The remaining question is: how long a way can the input-output structure go in generating real persistence? Our next result shows that, when N is sufficiently large, the ratio of the output response in period

t to that in period t - 1 is sufficiently close to 1.
PROPOSITION

3.5: In the perfect foresight equilibrium, the equality

lim
1 - PN (t)
N-+oo 1 - PN(t - 1)

holds for all t

~

=

1

(21)

1.

According to (21), arbitrary real persistence obtains when there is a sufficient number of stages. In
the proof of this proposition, we show that when N approaches infinity, the price level does not change
and real output carries the full burden of adjustment. Thus the chain-of-production mechanism goes a
long way in generating real persistence.

4

Conclusion

We have shown that a model with multiple stages of production and sticky prices helps explain the behavior of inflation and aggregate output following a monetary shock. The effects of the shock on the inflation
rate and real output are more persistent, the greater the number of production stages. With a sufficient
number of stages, arbitrary real persistence obtains.
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To help exposition, we have assumed a dense input-output structure, with labor being used at the first
stage only. These assumptions are not essential for our results. Our conclusion does not hinge upon the
assumption that production of a good at a given stage uses all outputs produced at the previous stage.
To dampen the fluctuations of marginal costs across stages, what matters is that input-supplying firms do
not change their prices simultaneously. It does not matter whether the input-supplying firms constitute
all or just a fraction of the firms of the previous stage. Neither do our results depend on the assumption
that labor is used at the first stage only. With labor input at every stage, the mechanism through which
marginal cost fluctuations are dampened along the production chain works in the same way as in the
baseline model.
To assess the quantitative importance of the input-output structure in explaining the relationship between money, prices, and output, however, we do need to have labor input at every stage and to calibrate
the share of labor and of intermediate goods at each stage. A sensible quantitative model built for this
purpose should also take into account labor market rigidity, for there is overwhelming evidence on such
rigidity. In a model like this, labor and purchased materials are both a component of cost. With nominal rigidity in both the labor market and the goods market and through the interactions of prices and
costs along the production chain, the model is likely to account for a significant fraction of the observed
fluctuations in the inflation rate and real output following a monetary shock. 6
The quantitative importance of the input-output structure also depends on the number of production
stages (the N in our model). Calibrating the value of N, however, requires a detailed examination of
the input-output table. In light of our conclusion that the input-output structure is potentially a powerful
mechanism in propagating monetary shocks, an empirical investigation of the input-output table should
be elevated to the top of the research agenda. Casual observations do suggest that N is likely to be
large. On this, Gordon (1990) pictures the world as "a gigantic n x n matrix, where n is measured in
the thousands, if not the millions .... The gigantic matrix represents the real world, full of heterogeneous
firms enmeshed in a web of intricate supplier-demander relationships." In this web, the intricately made
computer is perhaps just a tiny node.

6S ee Huang and Liu (1998) for a quantitative model of nominal wage rigidity with micro-foundations. For a chain-of-

production model with capital accumulation, see Huang and Liu (1999).
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Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION

3.1: Using (10), (11) and m(t)

=

1 for t 2: 0, we obtain

w(t) = 1 + [w(O) - 1]/,8t

(22)

for each t 2: O. Subsituting (22) into (9) for the case with n = 1 yields

PI(t) = 1 + 2[w(0) - 1]/[,8t(1 + ,8)]

(23)

for each t 2: O. Substituting (12) into (9) leads to

Pn(t) = 2(1

1

+ ,8)Pn-I(t -

1

1)

,8

+ 2Pn - I (t) + 2(1 + ,8)Pn-I(t + 1)

(24)

for each t 2: 0 and each n E {2, ... ,N}. Using (23) and (24), we can prove by induction on n that

Pn(t)

= 1 + 2[w(0) - 1]/[,8t(1 + ,8)]

(25)

for each t 2: n - 1 and each n E {2, ... ,N}. It then follows from (12), (23) and (25) that

Pn (t) = w (t )

(26)

for each t 2: n and each n E {1, ... ,N}.
We claim that the only value of w(O) that is consistent with an equilibrium is w(O)

=

1. If otherwise,

w(O) > 1 or w(O) < 1, then by (22), as t goes to infinity, w(t) diverges to plus or minus infinity at a
rate of 1/,8, so does the price level PN(t) as implied by (26). These possibilities, however, can be ruled
out as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983, 1986). The hyper-inflationary path with w(t) --+

00

cannot be an

equilibrium, because with the log-utility in real balances the household would suffer an infinite utility loss
as real balances approach zero along such a path. The hyper-deflationary path with w(t) --+

-00

cannot

be an equilibrium either, because it would violate the appropriate transversality condition with respect to
real balances. Therefore, w(O)

=

1, and there is a unique equilibrium in which w(t)

=

1 for all t 2: 0

according to (22). That is, equation (13) holds. Equations (14) and (15) then follow from (23), (25) and
(26). Finally, equation (16) follows from (10), (13) and (15). This completes the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION

3.2: We prove (17) by induction on n. We first verify (17) for n

=
(15) results in P2(0) =

Equation (14) implies that PI (0)

1 and thus PI (0)

PI (1) = 1 by

1 - 1/[2(1

+ ,8)]

= 1/2 according to
< 1 according to (9).

=

1.

(12). This together with
Therefore, (17) holds for

n = 1. This would be the end of the proof of (17) if N = 2. Without loss of generality, we assume
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N

> 2. Suppose that (17) holds for n with 1 :S n :S N - 2. We need to show that (17) holds for n + 1,

that is,
(27)

Fix an arbitrary t with 0 :S t :S n. It follows that -1 :S t - 1 :S n - 1 and 1 :S t + 1 :S n + 1. By the
induction hypothesis and (14), we have

with at least one strict inequality. Noticing that relation (24) holds for each t 2:: 0 and each n E
{2, ... , N}, we have
1

Pn+2(t) - Pn+l(t) = 2(1 + (3) [Pn+l(t - 1) - Pn(t - 1)]+
1

(3

2[Pn+l(t) - Pn(t)] + 2(1 + (3) [Pn+l(t + 1) - Pn(t + 1)] < 0,
which establishes (27). This completes the proof of (17).
To prove (18), fix an arbitrary n E {1, ... ,N - 1} and an arbitrary t with 0 :S t :S n. It follows that
-1 :S t - 1 :S n - 1. Then (14) and (17) imply that

with at least one strict inequality, which together with (12) leads to

Pn+ 1 ( t) - fin (t)

=

1

2[Pn+ 1 (t -

1) - Pn (t - 1)] +

1

2[Pn+ 1 ( t) -

Pn (t)] <

o.

This establishes (18), and thus completes the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION

we define 7rN(t)

3.3: We prove the proposition by induction on N. To simplify notations,

=PN(t) - PN(t -

1). Thus 7rN(t) is the inflation rate in period t when there are N

stages. The claimed inequality in (19) can be rewritten as

7rN+l(t)
7rN(t)
- 1) > 7rN(t - 1) ,

l:St:SN+1.

(28)

It is straightforward to verify that (28) holds for N

= 1 and N = 2. Now suppose it holds when there

7rN+l (t

are N > 2 stages. We need to show that it also holds when there are N

+ 1 stages.

That is, we need to

establish

7rN+2(t)
7rN+l(t)
7rN+2(t - 1) > 7rN+l(t - 1)'

1 :S t :S N

+ 2.

(29)
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We proceed by first noting that, when adding an additional stage to a chain with N stages, (9)-(12) remain
to be equilibrium conditions for the modified economy with N

+

1 stages, with N

+

1 in place of N

everywhere.
Manipulating (9) and (12) for index N

2(1~,B)PN(t -

_
(t) _ {
PN+l
-

1)

+ 1 leads to

+ ~PN(t) + 2(1~,B)PN(t + 1),

,B
2(1+,B)PN(0) + 2(1+,B)PN(I),

ift 2 1,

(30)

1

if t = 0,

which, along with the notation 7rN(t) == PN(t) - PN(t - 1), implies that

7rN+l(t)

=

1

2(1~,B) 7rN(t - 1) + ~7rN(t) + 2(1~,B) 7rN(t + 1), if t 2 2,
~7rN(O) + ~7rN(I) + 2(1!,B)7r N (2),
ift = 1,
~7rN(O) + 2(1!,B) 7rN(I),
ift = O.

1

2(1~,B)7rN+l(t - 1) + ~7rN+l(t) + 2(1!,B)7rN+1(t + 1), ift 22,
~7rN+l(O) + ~7rN+l(l) + 2(1!,B)7rN+1(2),
ift = 1,
~7rN+l(O) + ~7rN+l(I),
ift = O.

(31)

Similarly, the 7rN+2(t) term in (29) is given by

7rN+2(t)

=

(32)

By the induction hypothesis, we have
7rN+l (t + 1)
7rN(t + 1)
7rN+l (t)
> 7rN( t) ,
7rN+l(t-l)
7rN(t-l)
7rN+l (t - 2) > 7rN(t - 2) ,

7rN+l (t + 1)

if

(33)

2:::; t :::; N;

if

7rN+l(t)
7rN(t)
7rN+l(t -1) > 7rN(t - 1)'

= 7rN(t + 1) = 7rN(t) = 0,

7rN+l (t - 1)
7rN(t - 1)
7rN+l(t-2) > 7rN(t-2)'
7rN+l(t + 1)
7rN+l(t-l)
7rN+l(t-2)

7rN+l (t)
7rN(t)
7rN+l(t - 1) > 7rN(t - 1)'

t

=N +

(34)

1;

= 7rN+l(t) = 7rN(t + 1) = 7rN(t) = 7rN(t - 1) = 0,
7rN(t-l)
> 7rN(t-2)'

if

t= N

(35)

+ 2.

Finally, (31)-(35) along with Lemma 1 establish that
7rN+2(t)
7rN+l(t)
7rN+2(t - 1) > 7rN+l(t - 1)'

3:::;

t:::;

N

+ 2.

To establish (29), it remains to show that
7rN+2(2)
- - >7rN+l(2)
- - - (for

7rN+2(1)

7rN+l(l)

t = 2),

and

(for

t = 1).
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Given (31) and (32), it is equivalent to showing that, for t

~1fN+1(1) + ~1fN+1(2) + ~1fN+1(3)

~1fN+1(0) + ~1fN+1(1) + 2(1~,8)1fN+1(2)

and for t

=

= 2,
~1fN(1) + ~1fN(2) + ~1fN(3)

~1fN(0) + ~1fN(1) + 2(1~,8)1fN(2)

>

,

1,

~1fN+1 (0) + ~1fN+1(1) + ~1fN+1(2)

~1fN+1 (0) + ~1fN+1(1)

~1fN(0) + ~1fN(1) + ~1fN(2)

~1fN(0) + ~1fN(1)

>

Both inequalities follow from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.4: We prove the proposition by induction on N. Define YN(t)

=1-

PN(t) so that (20) can be written as
YN+dt) > YN(t)
YN+1(t - 1)
YN(t - 1)'

1 :=; t :=; N.

(36)

We shall verify in Lemma 1 that (36) holds for N = 1,2,3. Suppose that (36) holds for N
to show that (36) holds for N

~

3. We need

+ 1, that is,

YN+2(t) > YN+1(t)
YN+1(t - 1)'
YN+2(t -1)

(37)

1:=;t:=;N+1.

We first use (30) to obtain a recursive relation

YN+1 (

t) _ {
-

2(1~,8) YN(t -

1) +

1

1

2(1+,8) YN(O) + 2" +

~YN(t) +

2(&,8) YN(t
~
2(1+,8) YN(1),

+ 1), if t ~ 1,
ift = O.

(38)

Similarly, we obtain the YN+2(t) term in (37)

YN+2 (

t) _ {
-

2(1~,8)YN+1(t 1

2(1+,8)YN+1(0)

1) +

~YN+1(t) +

~ 1,
ift = O.

2(1!,8)YN+1(t + 1), ift

1,8

+ 2" + 2(1+,8)YN+1(1),

We then note that a version of Proposition 1 holds for the modified economy with N

(39)

+ 1 stages,

with

N + 1 in place of N everywhere. Using (15) and the induction hypothesis, we obtain

YN+1(t + 1)
YN(t + 1)
YN+1(t) > YN(t) ,
YN+1(t - 1)
YN(t - 1)
YN+1(t - 2) > YN(t - 2)'

YN+1(t

YN+1(t) > YN(t)
YN+1 (t - 1)
YN(t - 1) ,
if

2:=; t :=; N

+ 1) = YN(t + 1) = YN(t) = 0,

YN+1(t - 1)
YN(t - 1)
YN+1(t-2) > YN(t-2)'

if

-

1;

YN+1(t) > YN(t)
YN+1(t - 1)
YN(t - 1)'

t = N;

(40)

(41)
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YN+1(t + 1) = YN+1(t) = YN(t + 1) = YN(t) = YN(t - 1)
YN+1(t - 1)
YN(t - 1)
if t = N + 1.
YN+1(t - 2) > YN(t - 2)'

=

0,

(42)

Finally, (38)-(42) and Lemma 1 imply that

YN+2(t) > YN+1(t)
YN+2(t - 1)
YN+1(t - 1)'

2:s;t:S;N+1.

To establish (37), it thus remains to show that

YN+2(1) > YN+1(1)
YN+2(0)
YN+1(0) ,
which, given (38) and (39), is equivalent to showing that

~YN+1(0) + ~YN+1(1) + ~YN+1(2)

2(1~,8) YN +1 (0) + ~ + 2(1~,8) YN +1 (1)

~YN(O) + ~YN(l) + ~YN(2)
>

2(1~,8) YN (0) + ~ + 2(1~,8) YN(l)

(43)

To establish (43), by Lemma 1, it suffices to show that

YN+1(2) > YN(2)
YN+1(1)
YN(l)'

YN+1(1) > YN(l)
11'

The first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis, the second follows from (18) for index N in
an economy with N

+ 1 stages, and the last equality is trivial.

This establishes (37), and thus completes

the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.5: In light of (10), (12) and (13), it suffices to show that, for each t
lim PN(t) =

N~oo

o.

~

0,

(44)

We proceed by first showing that the limit exists. Similarly as in the proofs of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2,
we can show that PN(t) is monotonically decreasing in N. The recursive relations in (24) imply that, for
all N ~ 2, PN(t) is a weighted average of the first-stage prices P1( -1), P1(0), ... , and P1(t

+N

- 1).

This together with (14) and the fact thatp1( -1) = 0 implies thatpN(t) is uniformly bounded from below
by 0 and from above by 1. Therefore, for each t ~ -1, the limit of PN(t) as N
limit by p(t). Then, trivially p( -1)

=

00

exists. Denote this

0, and

O:s; p(t):S; 1,

(45)

for each t ~ O. It remains to show that p(t)
for index N and for each t

-+

~

0:

=

0 for each t ~ O. For convenience, we rewrite here (24)
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Since each of the four terms in the above equation converges to a finite limit, taking N --+

00

on both

sides of the equation leads to

1

~

1

p(t) = 2(1 + ~)p(t - 1) + 2P(t) + 2(1 + ~)p(t + 1),
which can be rewritten as p(t

p(t+l)-p(t)=

+ 1) - p(t) = [P(t) - p(t -

1)]/~.

By iterating on t, we get

1) t+l
(~ [P(O)-p(-l)].

(46)

Summing up both sides of (46) through periods 0, ... ,t, and using p( -1)

=

°and °<

~

<

1, we have

p(t + 1) = p(O)[(l/ ~)t+2 - 1]/[(1/~) - 1].7 It follows that, for each t 2: 0,
p(t) =

[

-1] p(O).

(l/~)t+l
(1/~) _ 1

(47)

Equation (47) implies that p(O) = 0. If otherwise p(O)

p(t) > 1 for t 2:

T,

> 0, then there exists some

a contradiction to (45). It follows immediately that p(t)

=

T

°

2:

for t

°

such that

2: 0. This

completes the proof.

LEMMA 1: Let

A, B, G, D and a, b, e, d be arbitrary nonnegative real numebrs. Then,

{3
D
+2IG +~
1
A IB
(3
G >
2(1+{3)
+ 2 + 2(1+{3)
1

~

B

if one of the following

1
b 1
{3
d
~ +2e+~
1
Ib ~
2(1+{3) a + 2 + 2(1+{3) e

(48)

three conditions holds:

(ii)

Q>4
c>c
c - c' B - b' ~ 2: ~, with at least one strict inequality,
D=d=e=O, f2:5' ~ 2: ~, with at least one strict inequality,

(iii)

G = D = b = e = d = 0,

(i)

B

if>

b

a'

where all variables are strictly positive unless specified otherwise.
PROOF: We first prove (48) under (i). Cross multiplying the terms on both sides of (48) and expanding

the resulting expressions show that (48) is equivalent to the following inequality:

1
1
~
1
1
~
4(1 + ~)2 Ba + 4(1 + ~) Bb + 4(1 + ~)2 Be + 4(1 + ~) Ga + 4Gb + 4(1 + ~) Ge
~

~

(49)

~2

+ 4(1 + ~)2 Da + 4(1 + ~) Db + 4(1 + ~)2 Dc
7ProposHion 4 in fact holds even in the case without discounting, i.e., with
implies that p(t)

f3

= 1. To see this, note that in this case (46)

= tp(O) for all t 2: 1. Therefore, the only value that p(O) can take is O. If otherwise p(O) > 0, then p(t) > 1

for all t 2: ljp(O), a contradiction to (45). It then follows immediately that p(t) = 0 for all t 2: O.
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1

1

{3

1

1

Be

> 4(1 + (3)2 Ab + 4(1 + (3) Ae + 4(1 + (3)2Ad + 4(1 + (3) Bb + 4
{3

{3

(3

+ 4(1 + (3) Bd

(32

+ 4(1 + (3)2 Cb + 4(1 + (3) Ce + 4(1 + (3)2 Cd
Using (i) to compare the two sides of (49) tenn by tenn leads to a conclusion that the tenns on the lefthand side are always larger than or equal to the corresponding tenns on the right-hand side, except for
those tenns involving Be and Cb . We thus need to show that

{3

1

1

{3

+ (3)2 Be + 4Cb ~ 4Be + 4(1 + (3)2 Cb,

4(1

or, by collecting tenns, that

~ [1 -

fJ)2]

(1 :

(Be - Cb)

~ O.

The above inequality holds since 0 < (3 < 1 and Be

~

Cb by (i). Since there is at least one strict

inequality in (i), (49) holds, and so does (48). The proof of (48) under (ii) or (iii) is similar, with the
specified zero tenns imposed in (49). This completes the proof.
LEMMA 2: For any positive real numbers

and

A, B, C, D and a, b, e, d, the conditions ~ > ~, ~ >

~ imply that

§>

1

B

2A

1

+ 2B + 2(1+{3) C

1

B

1

+ 2(1+{3) B

~

{3
D
+21c +~

1
b 1
{3
d
~ +2e+~

>11~
2 a + 2b + 2(1+{3) e

(3

1

and

~
2A
PROOF:

{3

+~

C

{3

1

>

b

{3

~+~e
1

2a +

(3
2(1+{3) b

(Similar to the proof of Lemma 1).

LEMMA 3: In the perfect foresight equilibrium, the inequalities

1 - i5N+1(t)
1 - i5N+1(t - 1)

------>
holdfor N

1 - i5N(t)
1 - i5N(t - 1)'

1~t~N,

= 1,2,3.

PROOF:

Equations (12), (14), and (15) together with P1 (-1)

1

i51(O)=2'

i51(t)=1,

=

0 imply that

t~l.

Using the above solutions and repeatedly applying (30) result in the following solutions:

_
P2(O)

1 + 2{3

_

= 4(1 + (3) , P2 ( 1) =

3 + 4{3
4 (1 + (3) ,

i52 (t)

=

1,

t ~ 2,

5'
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1 + 4(3
+ (3)'

_

P3(0) = 8(1
_

P3(2)

=

_ 1 _ 4 + 13(3 + 8(32
8(1 + (3)2 '

P3() -

7 + 16(3 + 8(32
8(1 + (3)2 '

_

P3(t)

=

1,

t ~ 3,

_ (0) = 1 + 9(3 + 17(32 + 8(33
_ (1) = 5 + 29(3 + 41(32 + 16(33
16(1 + (3)3
,P4
16(1 + (3)3
'

P4

_ (2) = 11

P4
P4(t)

=

1,

+ 44(3 + 48(32 + 16(33 _ (3)
16(1 + (3)3
,P4
t

=

15 + 48(3 + 48(32 + 16(33
16(1 + (3)3
'

~ 4.

It is then straightforward to verify the claimed inequality by direct substitutions.
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Table 1.
Response of Price Indices
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= 20

Pn(t)

n=l

n=2

n=5

Pn(O)

0.50

0.37

0.24
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Pn(l)

1.00

0.87

0.65

0.49

0.36

Pn(2)

1.00

1.00

0.89

0.73

0.56
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Table 2.
Output Persistence

N=l

N=2

N=5

N= 10

N=20

Contract Multiplier

0.00

0.20

0.46

0.62

0.73

Half Life

0.50
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1.41
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Figure 1:-Chain structure of the economy

26

1
1

1

I

~

1

,

...

1
1
1
1

P2( -1)=0

P 2(1)=7/8

P 2(0)=3/8

1
1

1

.J
.~

,/

P2(0)=3/4

} price index

P2(1)=1

1
1
1

.~

'-

.~

"-1

} price decision

1

""'

1
1

PI (0)=112
I, ~

,
PI (-1)=0

1= -1

,.

...

~

.
~

/

PI (0)=1

1=0

""'
PI (2)=1

PI (1)=1

PI (1)=1

,.

.J

,

••

} price index

PI (2)=1

1=1

Figure 2:-Price adjustments across stages

1=2

eN = 2, (3 = 1)

t

